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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE TACTICAL PROBLEM
The encounter treated is that of an Antl-Submarine
Warfare barrier consisting of submarines. Each barrier
submarine is confined to an operating area, hereafter called
a cell, due to the requirement to remain in a safe haven.
The cell is part of a larger barrier across a restricted
passage of width D. The transiting submarine is obliged
to pass through the passage, and hence the barrier. The
barrier has uniform cells and may be composed of several
cells in depth. All detections are made with passive SONAR.
No external intelligence of the position of either opposing
.force is allowed. All detections are made by the submarines
and all kills are made without the aid of external forces.
Transiting submarines are alone, and the time between tran-
sits is sufficiently long to prevent there being any effect
of one transit upon another. If cells are arranged in se-
quence along the transit track, they are sufficiently sepa-
rated to prevent there being any effect of one engagement
upon another (This assumption is relaxed for purposes of
investigation in Section II.C). The barrier is sufficiently
wide (D is sufficiently large) to make any special effects
from the cells on the ends negligible.
By virtue of the above assumptions, the encounter may
be studied as a single cell with a single transiting submarine,
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and a single barrier submarine. The barrier In total may
then be constructed probabilistically from the building
block of one cell. Figure (1) is a geographical diagram
of one cell in the barrier, with pertinent variables
labelled.
B. THE SIMULATION
For the purposes of simulation, the following assump-
tions were deemed appropriate
:
(1) The transiting submarine chooses a penetration
point uniformly along the cell front, since the limits of
the cell are unknown to it.
(ii) The transiting submarine proceeds at transit speed
(VT ) until detecting the barrier submarine, at which time
it slows to quietest speed to evade.
(ill) The transiting submarine penetrates the cell
front perpendicularly, and continues on a straight track
throughout
.
(iv) No counter measures are employed.
(v) The barrier submarine proceeds at patrol speed (Vg)
across its cell until a detection, at which time it commences
interception tactics. For a short initial period it steers
the target's bearing, after which time sufficient informa-
tion is available for a firm track. When firm track is















The simulation was by digital computer. It serves the
purpose of providing data for analysis only, and is des-
cribed here to give insight into the likely characteristics
of the data. The validity of the simulation is not a subject
of direct analysis. The ability of the data to support
reasonable models, and internal consistency were the facets
of validity tested. The simulation was constructed and
run by the Center for Naval Analyses and should be con-
sidered separate from the analysis contained herein.
The simulation is a time-stepped, event-store, Monte-
Carlo program. Each stochastic process is modeled stochas-
tically, and each probabilistic event is determined by ran-
dom number. Input parameters include acoustic character-
istics of both submarines, sea conditions, initial veloci-
ties of both submarines and weapons load of both submarines.
Sea conditions were not varied for any simulation runs.
Two hundred and fifty replications of each submarine
pairing were conducted. Taking any particular binary value
output by the simulation to be a bernoulli random variable
(i.e.: target killed or not killed), the variance of any
probability estimator is
Var (£) = P»- - P)
n
This quantity is maximized for a p of .5, so the maximum
possible variance of such output is .001.
13

With two hundred and fifty replications the Central
Limit Theorem will be assumed to hold, and hence the
estimators will be assumed to be distributed as gaussian
random variables.
C. THE ANALYTICAL PROBLEM
The original analysis of the tactical problem was
conducted by simulation. Seven distinct barrier submarine
hull and sonar combinations and four distinct transiter
hull and sonar combinations were included.
Various quantities were compiled and computed from the
simulation run, most for the purpose of checking consistency.
The sole parameters finally desired from this simulation
were the probabilities of kill for the barrier and the
transiting submarines.
The number of distinct simulations is expressed as the
product of (i) the number of cell widths sufficiently close
to allow interpolation and sufficiently numerous to avoid
extrapolation; (ii) the number of opposing velocity pairs;
(iii) the product of the numbers of distinct opposing
submarines. The essence of the problem is thus to reduce
the information contained in such output to a tractable
analytical expression. The purpose of this reduction is
four-fold. First, the information must be made convenient
for a decision maker. Second, the information should be
expressed as a function of tactical parameters and
characteristics to allow inspection of the dynamics of the
14

problem and to assess validity. Third, the information
should be expressed as a function of input parameters and
decision variables to enable the comparison of alternative
courses of action. Fourth, an acceptable analytical model
can either reduce or eliminate the need for further




II. THE SEARCH MODEL
The following discussion treats the searcher as moving
and the target as stationary, in order to be in consonance
with discussions in the literature. Clearly, the inter-
changeability of searcher and target may be used to achieve
a desired result.
A common model in search theory is the Random Search
Model, now a classic in the field [see ref. 1], The
assumptions for' this search law to hold are listed in
ref. 1 as
(i) The target (here the searcher) is uniformly
distributed within A.
(ii) The observer's (here "the target's") path is
random in A in the sense of as having its different (not
too near) portions placed independently of one another
in A.
(iii) On any portion of the path which is small
relatively to the total length of path but decidedly larger
than the range of possible detection, the observer always
detects the target (here "the target is always detected by
the searcher") within the lateral range W/2 on either side
of the path and never beyond. This last assumption can be
relaxed to the extent that a number W (search sweep width)




P(x) = P(detect a target passing
at lateral range x)
A searcher with lateral range curve P(x) will detect as
many targets in the entire plane as one with a definite
range law detector such as indicated by assumption (iii),
as long as the targets are distributed uniformly, and as
long as
00
/ P(x) dx = W
where W is the diameter of the definite search law detector,
Under the Random Search Law,
P(detection) = 1 - e
"W£/A
W = sweep width
i = track length
A = area containing target
If the searcher transits through A then
A " C
C = width of A
thus
P(detection) = 1 = e"W/C
17

For the purposes of this analysis, the assumptions of
the Random Search Law hold, with the exception of (ii).
The searcher (target in this context) is not searching
along a random track, but is actually proceeding directly
along an effectively zig-zag non-overlapping track relative
to the target.
A second model is developed in ref. 1 which may also
be applied. This model is a barrier model. It will be
referred to here as the Channel Patrol Model.
Suppose a searcher patrols at speed v across a channel
of width c. Then one patrol (here a channel crossing) is
completed. in — hours. The target is approaching at speed
u straight down the channel. During one patrol of the
searcher he travels — u miles. Relative to the target,







Thus the total area within which the target may be
found in one patrol is




The Channel Patrol Model
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The total relative area swept by the searcher In one
patrol is
B = (velocity) (time) (sweep width)
= (w) (£) W
If the target is located within this relative area
uniformly, then the probability of detection is
n w (-) W TT




w = yu2 + v 2 = u-v/l + (J) 2
then
P(det) = £v"i + (J) 2 = * ku
Wif p- k << 1 then approximately
-w k
P(det) = 1 - e C
This approximation involves some reduction in the




This may be justified in that the constrictions of a cell
or channel will deny the barrier submarine the portion of
his sensor's range which is beyond the limits of his cell.
This phenomenon will be called clipping, and will be
discussed in Appendix B.




P(kill) = 1 - e °




v v 21 + (—y channel patrol
model
The quantities p and k are statistically nuisance parameters,
and may be suppressed by defining a new quantity, kill
sweep width, and also denoted W, so that
_
W
(1) P(kill) = 1 - e C
W = kill sweep width
The advantage of this representation is that p is no
longer needed, provided that kill sweep width can be




Rather than questioning the reasonableness of the
assumptions, or the applicability of the model to the
tactical problem, an alternative approach seems fruitful.
Let us suppose the applicability of the model and then
test the supposition statistically.
It is natural to suppose that W (sweep width) is a
function of at least (a) speed of both submarines and
(b) quietness of both submarines. It is explicitly not
a function of C (cell width). The obvious test of the
Random Search Model is to invert the formula, injecting
known C and monte-carlo estimates of P(kill) to obtain
W estimates, and then test the variability of w with
respect to C. Now,
Pk




W = -C log
e
(1 - pk )
Both a W_ and W„ are found, which are those associated
with the transiter and barrier respectively.
From considerations of the data, not included here, it
is immediately obvious that the variation in W with respect
to C is very small. This impression was verified statis-
tically using analysis of variance. It was found that the
22

variations In W were justifiably attributed to statistical
fluctuation in the monte-carlo estimation of P(kill), and
not to any systematic model inconsistencies. The detection/
kill model is thus supported statistically (see statistical
appendix) in the sense that it fails to be contradicted.
A traditional approach to the simulation data used here
probably involve the estimation of W from technological
considerations, and a comparison of this computed value and
the attendant probabilities to the results of the simulation,
The approach taken herein is to take the simulation results
and derive the implied values of W. Validation of the model
would then involve consistency within the model. The main
reason for this approach is that only kill probabilities
are desired, whereas typical estimation of w is for search
sweep width. Thus inversion of the procedure allows for
elimination of the necessity of analytically solving the
kinematical problem of kill, counter-detection and evasion,
which is the primary source of difficulty in the traditional
approach. Additionally, should the predicted sweep width be
sufficiently different from an experimentally derived value,
then the classical approach offers little recourse except




C. IMPLICATIONS OP THE MODEL
There are very important tactical considerations which
might argue for various barrier configurations for
submarines." Two building block configurations are here
examined to determine their probabilistic advisability.
The first is the "stacked" barrier, with submarines deployed
in depth. The second is the "packed" barrier with
submarines deployed along a line (see Fig. 3).
Now, suppose that there is some larger barrier of
width D in which these cells are placed. Alternative I is
to place one packed barrier, alternative II is to stack k
less dense barriers with the same number of submarines,
across the channel D.
Let
n = number of submarines in the barrier
p, = P(kill a transiter under I)
P 2
= P(kill a transiter under II)
Ql = 1 - Pi
q2
= 1 - p 2
Now, cell width for any single line barrier is related
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The Packed and Stacked Barriers
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and assuming independence among stacked barriers
Wn„ Wn„ Wn
1 2 _ k
, D " D D
1 - P 2
=
^2
= e e • • • e
where there are k stacked barriers, each with n, submarines









Thus there is nothing probabilistic to distinguish between
the two barriers under independence.
Assuming, on the other hand, that there exists some
dependence among the k stacked barriers, then either type
of dependence is possible. The type of dependence results
from the nature of the opposing forces. There are only
four possible results from a transit across the barrier.
They are the following states
:
1 Barrier killed transiter survives
2 Transiter killed barrier survives
3 Both submarines killed
4 No submarines killed
In the case of 2 and 3, the type of dependence between the
barrier in question and subsequent barriers is unimportant
since the transiter submarine has been killed, and
thus will not encounter any subsequent barrier.
26

In the case of 1, it is likely that the combat between the
two submarines would alert the next barrier, or possibly
several barriers, and allow for maximum readiness and
optimum placing. In the case of 4, whatever special
circumstances allowed the transiter to evade the first
barrier would be likely to carry over into the second
barrier. These arguments are expressed analytically as
follows. Let
Pi1
= p ( enter state jjleave state i)
i = 1,2,3,4
1 = 1,2,3,4
where one state transition occurs upon transiting one
barrier. Then in these cases




4j J = 1 » 2 ' 3
Remembering that states 1 and 4 correspond to transiter
not killed, and states 2 and 3 correspond to transiter
killed it can be seen that If the first encounter results
In state 4, then the transiter will be most likely to
avoid being killed by a state 4 result in subsequent
barriers. If the first encounter results in state 1, then
27

the transiter Is more likely to be killed by a state 2
result In subsequent barriers. Thus, depending upon the
likely nature of the first encounter, the decision can be
made whether to stack or pack barriers.
28

III. PARAMETRIC PREDICTION OF SWEEP WIDTH
A. DESCRIPTION OF INPUTS
The applicability of the Random Search Model being
established, the next step is to find a method for predicting
the value of W in Eq. tl) . Since the analysis is intended
to serve as an aid to decision making, it is desirable to
use variables in the prediction whose relationship to W is
simple, and which are under the control of the decision-
maker, or tactical commander.
In submarine warfare, an important measure of effective-
ness of a submarine is its acoustic quietness, called
FIGURE-OF-MERIT (FOM). FOM measures the self noise of the
submarine, as well as the signal level of the opponent.
It combines these quantities into one, expressing the
quietness of the submarine relative to its opponent.






L /10 L- /10
L
s
= 10 log10 (10
sm
+ 10 SV )
L /10 L /10 L /10
L
e
= 10 log10 (10
ea
+ 10 em + 10 eV )
L = Radiated Noise
s
L = radiated machinery noise
sm






L „ = ambient self noiseea
L „ = machinery self noiseem
L „ = velocity self noiseev
DT = Detection Threshold
Velocities for computation were taken as VR , the
barrier patrol speed, and VT , the transit speed. After
detection, velocities changed for both submarines, but no
account of this was taken, since this represented mainly
kinematics.
B. THE ESTIMATING RELATIONSHIP
The dependent variables to be predicted were W™ and W*B
(sweep width of transiter and barrier, respectively).
Independent variables were assumed to be FOMR and FOM_
(FIGURE OF MERIT Barrier and Transiter, respectively). A
linear relationship was found to be the best predictor of
Kill Sweep Width, with form:
WT = a + b FOMT + d FOMg a,b,d,f,g,h >
(2)
WB
= f - g FOMT + h FOMB
Both kill sweep widths were tested, that for the
barrier (Wg) and the transiter (W„) , using stepwise linear
regression. In each case, it was found that the most
significant variable for predicting sweep width was the
30

FOM of the submarine to whom the W belonged. That is, the
most significant variable In predicting W„ was POMT . Both
FOM's were found to be significant for both sweep widths.
The coefficients preceding the variables in Eq. (2)
were all as might reasonably be expected, except for d,
the coefficient of FOMR . It would seem that the sign of d
should be negative, so that improvement in the performance
of the barrier submarine would degrade the performance of
the transiter . This would ordinarily be the case, except
for the implications of the tactical assumptions. Since
the transiter does not seek combat, all opportunity for
such combat arises by way of the barrier detecting the
transiter. Thus, as the barrier improves in performance,
more opportunity to attack arises for the transiter.
In order to ensure adequacy of the regression, two
additional tests were conducted. For each, the difference
between the predicted values of sweep width and the actual
values, called residuals, were found. These residuals were
tested using Analysis of Variance.
The first test concerned the hull types. The question
tested was whether there was any information associated
with the Hull/Sonar combinations which was not conveyed by
means of FIGURE OF MERIT. The results indicated that there
was no reason to believe that any additional Information




The second test was whether the patrol speed (VB ) or
the transit speed (VT ) had any effect beyond that conveyed
through FOM. The results indicated that the patrol speed
of the barrier submarine was not significant, whereas the
transit speed (V^) was significant. This is due to two
factors. First, the faster the transiter travels, the less
time he is exposed to detection. Second, the transiter is
less susceptible to intercept at higher speed. This
remaining effect due to V,_ is a drawback in the model,
since the best possible prediction is not being carried
out. In view of the excellent fit of the linear regression
(see the Statistical Appendix) the model seems adequate
for most needs. It is possible that the additional complica-
aion of the model or the increased need for model inputs
would make a more refined model undesirable.
C. A SECONDARY EFFECT OF THE ANALYSIS
In the course of the statistical analysis of the
simulation data, an important result was obtained, above
and beyond the requirements of data compactness and
manageability. The result was the detection, from
statistical considerations, of programming errors in the
simulation. Tactical simulations are always large, in a
computer code sense, and difficult to completely "de-bug".
In this instance, a logic control variable had been
included, to allow changing of torpedo P(kill) during a
run. The program was set up initially using dummy P(kill)'s
32

for all torpedoes. When the final data runs were made,
the logic control variable was set to inject the correct
P(kill)'s for barrier types 1 through 4, but was erroneously
omitted for barrier types 5 through 7. The omission was
not noticed until the statistical analysis began. As a part
of the statistical analysis, the residuals (Actual W minus
predicted W) were plotted for all submarine types. It was
noticed that barrier types 1 through 4 were all performing
poorer than predicted, and barrier types 5 through 7 were
performing better than predicted. This discontinuity was
not due simply to different Hull/Sonar types, because one
Hull type and one Sonar were found in both groups, although
not together. When the programmer saw this effect he
correctly deduced the error and re-ran the entire set of
barrier types 5 through 7. The resulting residuals were
again plotted, and no longer displayed the discontinuity.
It is unlikely that the error would ever have been discovered




The philosophy pursued herein, that a model is valid
if it Is statistically supported is a profitable philosophy
only Insofar as it aids analysis. If a model is reasonable
from an analytical point of view and also supportable
statistically j then the best solution has been arrived at.
It is the case here, as in many instances, that the model
chosen was not uniquely applicable, nor were its requisite
assumptions completely satisfied. Hopefully, any doubts
about applicability were dispelled by the compelling
statistical evidence.
The method of Inversion of results to obtain unknown
inputs, used here to determine W, is also somewhat
unorthodox. The resultant estimates of inputs are naturally
only as good as the original results. Assuming an acceptable
level of validity, these inverted quantities may be compared
to engineering or similar estimates, probably to the benefit
of both the engineering and tactical analyst. Perfectly
valid and useful models are no doubt frequently rejected
because the improper estimation of input quantities causes
inexplicable differences between actual and predicted
results. It seems reasonable, however, that statistically
verifiable consistency in quantities inverted by way of a
model would argue in favor of the model, and cause
re-examination of the engineering estimate in case of
disagreement. Conversely, models which are supposed to be
3^

invalid due to assumptions being clearly violated but which
are found to be statistically supportable can often be
extended to include the case in question by further
considerations of the problem. The phenomenon of clipping





1. Validation of the Model
The formula
p = P(kill) = 1 - e
W
C
was inverted to yield
W=-Cln(l-p)
W = kill sweep width
C = cell width
which then becomes a maximum likelihood estimator of W.
The hypotheses were
HQ : p
=' 1 - e
W
C
H-: HQ is false
or equivalently
H Q : W
= - c In (1 - p)
U
1
: HQ is false
36

The test was by analysis of variance using a Completely
Randomized Factorial design with treatments of barrier type,
transiter type and cell width at seven, four and three
levels, respectively. Submarine types were taken as
fixed factors, cell width as a random factor. Two separate
tests were conducted, one for Wg and one for W„ (barrier
and transiter kill sweep widths, respectively). F ratios
and significances were as tabulated in Tables I and II.
Based on the significance of the cell width treatment, the
null hypothesis was accepted at significance level of .05.




= a + b F0MT + d FOMg
W
B
= f - g F0MT + h FOMg





The regression was thus significant at the level of .05.
The t statistics associated with the constants b and d
were 18. 71^ and 2.98 respectively, both significant at .05
37







Barrier 6 80.1 a
Transiter 3 153.9 a
C 2 2.015 b






Barrier 6 76.94 a
Transiter 3 181.621 a







In each regression, data included each of twenty-eight
submarine pairings at two separate values of V"B and three
separate values of VT making a total of 168 data points.
In each regression there were no other variables ever
tested as independent variables, thus the significance
level reported is valid.
Upon completion of each regression, the residuals were
tested for any variability remaining which could be removed.
This was done by considering two analyses of variance of
each set of residuals.
The first post-regression analysis of variance used
barrier and transiter hull/sonar type as treatments at
7 and 4 levels respectively. The hypotheses were
HQ : Hull/Sonar type has no effect on the residual
H,: H Q false
Test design was Randomized Block Factorial Design with
a block consisting of the six distinct velocity pairings.
The two treatments were considered as fixed. P ratios and
significances were as tabulated in Tables III and IV. Based
on the resulting significances, the null hypothesis was
accepted. The overall significance was .05. This implies
an individual significance of .013* where
P(No test value outside critical region) = (1-a)
thus, (1 -a) 4 = .95
a = 1 - (.95) = .013
39

































The second post-regression analysis of variance used
V"B and V„ as treatments at two and three levels respectively.
The hypotheses were:









For this experiment, there were four separate tests,
one for each unit's velocity, and thus two for each
regression. The likelihood is that one or more of these
null hypotheses might be true with no implications for the
others. Experiment design was again Randomized Block
Factorial with each effect now taken as random. Each block
consisted of 28 distinct submarine pairings. F ratios and
significance levels are tabulated in Tables V and VI.
Based on the resulting significances, the velocity of the
transiting submarine is significant for the probability of
its detection and kill by the barrier submarine. This
result is probably due to the resulting reduced time
available to the barrier submarine to detect, and to the





































Suppose that a searcher has Lateral Range Curve p(x)
(vanishing after R) the probability of detecting a target
passing at lateral range x. Define
R
W - 2 / p(x) dx
Then if the target is uniformly distributed across width C,
centered at the observer.
P(detect) = ]£ R < C
Now, however, suppose that the curve p(x) vanishes
outside a range R greater than C, and that the searcher is
constrained to remain within width C and thus may not
pursue nor take any action with respect to -a target outside
of C. Let the searcher's position from the edge of the
channel be denoted u (Figure 4 )
.
In this case, the probability of detecting a target
with lateral range (closest point of approach) distributed
uniformly across C, for a searcher at u is
u , C-u ,
P(det) = / p(x) £ dx + / p(x) £ dxC C
43

No clipping, searcher centered in channel
>u






P(det) = ^ {P(u) - P(C-u)} = £ We (u) < ^ W
where
u
P(u) = / p(x) dx
Now, if the searcher is in turn uniformly distributed
in position u across C, the probability of detection is
1
C
1P(det) = w f P(x) - P(c-x) dx = £ Woc Q o a





P(det) = i W
e (§)
Clearly, if p(x) is decreasing in x for x positive, and
symmetric then
W W (—)
_a < e 2 < W
C - C - C
Thus against a uniform target, probability of detection
is greatest for a central position, and Is diminished by
*»5

patrolling. Of course, If patrol Is not conducted, the
possibility arises that barrier station location may become
compromised, so a patrol is clearly necessary.
Let p(x) be of the form
p(x) = e"ax a >
which is reasonable for passive sonar detection (see Ref. 1),
but intended only as an illustration. If the searcher is
at u = p (centered in the channel)
P(det) = |w
e (§)
= | (1 - e W )




=|(l,l(l-e" W ) )
These quantities are graphed in Pig. 5 as a function of
W
Tj, along with the quantities
W
p = 1 - e
C
and the Definite Range Law (Ref. 1)







The agreement Is seen to be excellent among the first three In
areas of mild clipping, and when there is excessive clipping,
the Random Search Law (Equation (1)) is somewhat optimistic.
This contrasts sharply with the obvious inaccuracy of the
last quantity, the Definite Range Law. It should now be
fairly clear- that the amount of clipping depends a great
deal on the shape of p(x), the lateral range curve.
Lacking any better information, the slight degradation
implied in the Random Search Law is quite probably suffi-
cient to a reasonable degree of accuracy. If, as In this
analysis, the data support the model, then there should be
no doubt as to its reasonableness.
Most cases of barrier patrol will probably be found to
lie between the cases of the searcher centered in the
channel and the searcher distributed uniformly across a
cell. The problem treated here was within the domain of
excellent agreement (moderate clipping), and hence the
law should reasonably hold, since the Lateral Range Curve
should have been roughly exponential in x. Thus the
applicability of the formula
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